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N Brown v. StateI the court of criminal appeals had to decide what
right to self-defense a defendant had when attacked by two men simul-
taneously. The defendant, Brown, stabbed a father and son after an
altercation that began as a fight with the father. Brown was convicted of
attempted murder of the father and of aggravated assault of the son. At
the trial the court instructed the jury concerning self-defense, but men-
tioned the father and son together repeatedly in its instruction, thus imply-
ing that to find Brown's use of deadly force against either victim justified,
the jury must find that Brown feared death or serious bodily injury from
both victims simultaneously. The court of criminal appeals reversed the
conviction because the charge had unduly restricted the jury's assessment
of the facts.2 The court held that if evidence shows that a defendant was in
danger of unlawful attack from two assailants, the trial court should in-
struct the jury that the defendant had the right to defend himself against
either or both.3
One who provokes another's use of force may not plead self-defense.4
Where the trial court limits the right to self-defense with a "provoking the
difficulty" instruction, however, the court must also charge on a defend-
ant's right to carry arms to the scene of a difficulty and to seek an explana-
tion, if the evidence supports such a charge. 5 In Banks v. State6 the court
of criminal appeals reversed a murder conviction in a case in which the
defense had inexplicably requested the provoker limitation instruction at
trial. The lower appellate court ruled that because the defendant had re-
quested the provoker limitation, he could not complain when the court
failed to include a charge regarding his potential right to carry arms to the
scene of a difficulty.7 The court of criminal appeals disagreed, holding
* B.A., J.D., University of Wisconsin. Assistant Professor of Law, St. Mary's Univer-
sity, San Antonio, Texas.
1. 651 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
2. Id. at 784.
3. Id.
4. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.3 1(b)(4) (Vernon 1974).
5. Gassett v. State, 587 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
6. 656 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
7. Id. at 446-47.
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that the defendant's request for the first instruction did not prevent him
from complaining when the trial court failed to give the other requested
charge.8 The court reversed the decision and remanded the cause for a
new trial.9
Two dissenting court of criminal appeals judges objected to the "right to
carry arms" counterinstruction. They labelled it part of the "Code of the
West," which proliferates "the romantic notion that everyone in Texas can
tote his .45 and settle his differences at high noon on main street."' 0 The
two judges argued that the legislature impliedly rejected this longstanding
Texas doctrine in 1973 when it comprehensively codified the law of self-
defense in the new Penal Code without including a right to arm and to
seek an explanation." Continued use of the countercharge, they argued,
would amount to advocating a violation of the law by allowing a person to
carry prohibited weapons.' 2 In answer to the dissent, however, Judge
Clinton noted that although one who carries a prohibited weapon violates
the law, he does not forfeit his right to use the weapon in self-defense.
13
Judge Clinton further noted that the court had earlier rejected the dissent's
argument regarding legislative intent. 4
B. Necessity
Although a majority in Banks held that a violation of the weapons stat-
ute would not result in a loss of right to use the prohibited weapon in self-
defense, two other court of criminal appeals' decisions during the survey
period appear to provide justification for the violation of carrying a
weapon in anticipation of violence. Johnson v. State' 5 and Armstrong v.
State'6 established that one may carry a prohibited weapon when faced
with a specific, imminent necessity. In both cases the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed convictions for carrying pistols contrary to Pe-
nal Code section 46.0217 because the trial courts failed to submit requested
8. Id. at 447. The court of criminal appeals also disagreed with the court of appeals'
conclusion that no evidence existed to support a charge on the right to arm and to seek an
explanation. The court found the defendant's own testimony sufficient to require the jury
instruction. Id
9. Id
10. Id. (McCormick, J., Campbell, J., dissenting).
1I. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31 (Vernon 1974).
12. 656 S.W.2d at 449; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02 (Vernon 1974) (unlawful to
carry weapons).
13. 656 S.W.2d at 452; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02 (Vernon 1974).
14. 656 S.W.2d at 451-52 (Clinton, J., concurring); see Young v. State, 530 S.W.2d 120
(Tex. Crim. App. 1975). In another case decided during the survey period, the San Antonio
court of appeals also upheld the rule on instructing on the right to carry arms. The state had
argued that a long line of cases beginning with Shannon v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 2, 28 S.W.
687 (1894), should be overruled "because the law on the right to arm oneself and seek expla-
nation no longer comports with contemporary times." Martinez v. State, 653 S.W.2d 630,
638 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, pet. refd). The court rejected this argument and re-
versed two murder convictions because the trial court failed to give the countercharge al-
though it burdened the self-defense instruction with the provoker limitation. Id.
15. 650 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc).
16. 653 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
17. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02 (Vernon 1974).
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instructions on the necessity defense to the juries. Johnson overruled con-
flicting parts of Roy v. State, 18 which appeared to foreclose the possibility
of a necessity defense to a weapons offense. In Armstrong and Johnson the
court rejected the state's argument, based on Roy, that the necessity de-
fense was unavailable as a matter of law to a violation of section 46.02.19
The court held that evidence that the defendants reasonably feared for
their safety based upon threats from specific persons was sufficient to re-
quire a necessity defense instruction.20 After Armstrong and Johnson, Roy
limits the weapon carrying prohibition to situations in which no immediate
necessity exists, such as mere presence in a high crime area.
Johnson and Armstrong provide a comparison of the related defenses of
necessity and duress. In both cases evidence of a specific threat from a
specific person who had already committed violent acts against the defend-
ant or whose reputation for violence was known to the defendant made the
necessity charge applicable. The more specific the threat from a particular
person, however, the more appropriate is a characterization of duress
rather than necessity.21 By failing to discuss the duress defense in Arm-
strong and Johnson, the court of criminal appeals blurred the distinction
between the duress and necessity defenses. Consequently, defense attor-
neys should seek a necessity instruction under Penal Code section 9.2222
instead of, or in addition to, a duress charge.
C Defense of Property
Imminence is a requirement of all necessity justifications.2 3 The lack of
18. 552 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Roy, who serviced coin-operated vending
machines in a high-crime area, was refused an instruction on the necessity defense for a
violation of the weapons statute. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the neces-
sity defense did not apply where legislative intent precluded its use. Id. at 831. The court
found such an intent in § 46.02 and determined that to allow all those who felt they were in
high-crime areas to carry prohibited weapons would openly thwart the purposes of the stat-
ute. Id
19. 653 S.W.2d at 810-11; 650 S.W.2d at 416.
20. 653 S.W.2d at 811; 650 S.W.2d at 416.
21. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.05 (Vernon 1974). Duress and necessity are closely
related defenses of justification. Both defenses involve a person's choosing between two
evils, and both may be defenses to criminal acts where that person proves that the violation
of the criminal law was a lesser evil than the harm that might have occurred without the
violation. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1140 (3d ed. 1982). One commen-
tary has explained the distinction as follows: "With the defense of necessity, the pressure
must come from the physical forces of nature (storms, privations) rather than from other
human beings. (When the pressure is from human beings, the defense, if applicable, is
called duress rather than necessity.)" W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMI-
NAL LAW § 50, at 381 (1972) (footnote omitted). The duress defense has several difficulties
not present in necessity: (1) duress is only a defense to a felony if the threat is of death or
serious bodily injury, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.05(a)-(b) (Vernon 1974); (2) duress is
unavailable if the actor intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly placed himself in a situation
in which he would probably be subject to compulsion, id § 8.05(d); and (3) the defense must
prove duress by a preponderance of the evidence (whereas once necessity is raised the state
must prove the absence of necessity beyond a reasonable doubt), id. §§ 2.04, 8.05, 9.22.
22. Id. § 9.22.
23. See id. § 9.22(l) (necessity). For specific necessity defenses, see id. § 8.05(a) (du-
ress); id §§ 9.31-.32 (self-defense); id § 9.33 (defense of a third person); id § 9.51-.52 (law
1984]
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imminence was fatal to the defendant's defense of property claim in Phoe-
nix v. State.24 Phoenix, the sole employee of a pool hall, fought outside
the hall with the victim. The victim threatened to break the defendant's
skull if he tried to re-enter the pool hall. The defendant then hit the victim
with a broken bottle and killed him. The trial court refused to instruct the
jury concerning the defense of property under Penal Code sections 9.41
and 9.42,25 and the court of criminal appeals affirmed. 26 The court found
that the defendant's testimony that he feared that the victim probably
would have destroyed the pool table was only a fear of potential damage to
the pool hall and that the defendant offered no evidence of an imminent
crime or damage to property.27
D. Defense of Third Person
In Ogas v. State2 8 the trial court refused to instruct the jury on self-
defense, in a case involving a pregnant woman who shot a man after he
slapped her. The court held that although a resort to simple force may
have been justified, her resort to deadly force was unjustified.2 9 The court
of appeals affirmed the refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense because
the victim's slap did not constitute the use or attempted use of deadly
force, and only such use or attempted use would trigger a right of respon-
sive deadly force.30 While the same rationale might have supported rejec-
tion of the defendant's claim of defense of a third party based upon
protection of the fetus, the court decided the claim on the basis of a thresh-
old issue. An unborn fetus is not included within the definition of a person
and, thus, cannot be the basis of a claim of defense of a third person. Ogas
argued that a series of cases required a jury charge on self-defense when-
ever justification for the use of even nondeadly force was supported by the
evidence. The court found that those cases involved construction of the
prior statute, however, and were no longer of precedential value.3' The
court of appeals considered the fact that the defendant was pregnant, and
that "a blow which would not cause death or serious bodily injury to a
person of normal health could cause reasonable apprehension of such con-
sequences to her [defendant]. '32 The court concluded, however, that the
single slap to the face and not the area of the fetus did not support the
required reasonable apprehension of death or serious bodily injury.33
enforcement); id § 9.41-.42 (defense of property); id § 9.43 (defense of third person's
property).
24. 640 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
25. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.41, .42 (Vernon 1974).
26. 640 S.W.2d at 307.
27. Id Because evidence indicated that defendant had been unlawfully dispossessed of
property, he would have been entitled to a charge under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.41
(Vernon 1974) (authorizing the use of force but not deadly force to recover property).
28. 655 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no pet.).
29. Id. at 324.
30. Id.





E Involuntary Intoxication and Insanity
Both the defense of involuntary intoxication and the mitigation of pun-
ishment aspect of voluntary intoxication are tied to the insanity defense
because both require that the defendant be rendered insane, albeit tempo-
rarily, due to the intoxicant when he committed the crime. 34 In Shurbet v.
State35 the court held that the fact that the defendant was an alcoholic did
not establish that intoxication on the day of the crimes was involuntary.36
Involuntariness is a prerequisite for the defense because, by statute, volun-
tary intoxication is not a defense to a crime. 37 The same statute states,
however, that "[e]vidence of temporary insanity caused by intoxication
may be introduced. . . in mitigation of the penalty attached to the offense
for which he is being tried."' 38 In Shurbet the trial court's failure to so
instruct the jury at the punishment phase of the trial resulted in a reversal
because the defendant presented some evidence that intoxication caused
him to be temporarily insane at the time of the alleged theft. 39
The Shurbet court might not have reached the same result had the case
been tried after August 29, 1983, the effective date of S.B. 7.40 S.B. 7
changed the Texas definition of insanity4' by eliminating the "irresistible
impulse" portion of the standard 42 and adding the requirement that the
mental disease or defect be severe. Under amended section 8.01 the jury
can find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity only if the defend-
ant, "as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his
conduct was wrong. '43 The legislature did not indicate in S.B. 7 whether it
34. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04(b) (Vernon 1974).
35. 652 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, no pet.). The Houston court of appeals
reached the same result on similar facts in Watson v. State, 654 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no pet.).
36. 652 S.W.2d at 428. The court, citing cases from other jurisdictions, noted that a
majority of states follow the view that an alcoholic's inability to control his drinking does
not constitute involuntary intoxication.
37. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04(a) (Vernon 1974). In contrast, involuntary intoxica-
tion is a judicially created defense. See Torres v. State, 585 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979).
38. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04(b) (Vernon 1974).
39. 652 S.W.2d at 428. Although error occurred only at the punishment phase of trial,
because the defense had elected to have the jury assess punishment, the error necessitated a
new trial.
40. Act of Aug. 29, 1983, ch. 454, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2640 [hereinafter cited as S.B.
No. 7] (codified at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
41. The pre-S.B. 7 definition of insanity was found in TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(a)
(Vernon 1974). That section stated:
(a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the con-
duct charged, the actor, as a result of mental disease or defect, either did not
know that his conduct was wrong or was incapable of conforming his conduct
to the requirements of the law he allegedly violated.
Id.
42. The irresistible impulse test questioned whether the defendant had a mental disease
that kept him from controlling his conduct. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, JR., supra note 21,
§ 37, at 283. The part of § 8.01 deleted in S.B. No. 7 reads: "or was incapable of con-
forming his conduct to the requirements of law he allegedly violated." S.B. 7, 1983 Tex.
Gen. Laws at 2640.
43. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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intended to change section 8.04 and its reference to temporary insanity.
The legislature did not refer to the defense of involuntary intoxication in
S.B. 7, although the decision that first recognized the defense explicitly tied
incapacity from involuntary intoxication to the insanity standard of the
Penal Code.44 If involuntary intoxication is tied to the insanity standard
of the Penal Code, then S.B. 7 may limit that defense's applicability.
The impact that S.B. 7 will have on the insanity defense depends upon
the significance that courts give the word "know." 45 Schuessler v. State
46
suggests that Texas courts use a broad definition of "know." Schuessler
admitted killing his four-year-old daughter to police officers who were to-
tally unaware of the crime. He told the officers that both he and his
daughter had been hexed. According to Schuessler, a devil in the form of
a black horse had tried to take his daughter's soul and that her head
swelled and her arms and legs shrank. He claimed to have killed her to
save her soul. The court of appeals reversed the defendant's murder con-
viction because the jury's rejection of a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity was "contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evi-
dence."'47 Unlike the man who strangles his wife because of an insane
delusion that he is squeezing lemons, Schuessler knew he was killing if
"knew" simply means "was aware." If, however, "know" refers to the af-
fective ability to appreciate the consequences of actions, then Schuessler
was probably insane even under the amended version of section 8.01. The
courts should clarify the scope of the new insanity standard and its appli-
cability to voluntary and involuntary intoxication in future cases.
44. See Torres v. State, 585 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
45. The only change instituted by S.B. 7, other than limiting the defense's applicability
to cases in which the actor did not know his conduct was wrong, is the requirement that any
mental disease or defect causing insanity be severe. See supra notes 40-43 and accompany-
ing text. Adding the word "severe" before "mental disease or defect" is particularly color-
less, since any mental disability that would rob a defendant of his ability to know that his
criminal act was wrong is surely severe. This statement is particularly true in light of the
fact that an insanity defense is a last resort, usually asserted only for very serious crimes.
See A. MATTHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 46-47 (1970).
46. 647 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, pet. granted).
47. Id at 749. By making this finding, rather than holding that the evidence to convict
was insufficient, the court avoided a double jeopardy bar to retrial. See Tibbs v. Florida,
457 U.S. 31 (1982). Whether a Texas appellate court has the authority to reverse on this
ground when mere disagreement with the jury's verdict exists rather than a finding that the
evidence is insufficient when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, is an important
question that has not been addressed in Texas. See Carter v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 777, 784-85
(5th Cir. 1982).
The jury's guilty verdict may be explained by the fact that the jury's request for supple-
mentary instructions concerning the effect of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity was
refused. The refusal was consistent with the holding in Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107,
122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), which stated that the consequences of such a verdict were not a
matter for the jury's concern. Id The court of criminal appeals reaffirmed Granviel in
Holder v. State, 643 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). S.B. 7 amends TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 46.03 (Vernon 1974) by adding a subsection (e) that makes adherence to Granviel
mandatory: "The court, the attorney for the state, or the attorney for the defendant may not
inform a juror or a prospective juror of the consequences to the defendant if a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity is returned." S.B. 7, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2641 (codified at





If the state's proof is insufficient on an essential element of a crime, the
defendant is entitled to an acquittal. Williams v. Slate48 involved the
state's failure to prove the essential element of agreement in the crime of
conspiracy. Williams plotted a kidnapping and asked the assistance of a
person who was an agent of the police. The agent, who feigned agreement
to the plot, was wired for sound and recorded the details of the defendant's
scheme. The defendant was arrested two days before he was to have com-
mitted the crime. Since no completed offense had occurred, the state could
only prosecute the defendant for an inchoate offense.49 The state obtained
a conviction for criminal conspiracy, but the court of criminal appeals re-
versed the conviction on the ground that the evidence showed no proof of
an agreement.50 The court concluded that because the defendant's only
"co-conspirator" had merely feigned agreement, there was no meeting of
the minds and hence no conspiracy. 5'
The court relied primarily upon cases decided under former Penal Code
conspiracy provisions, which were cast in terms of two or more persons
agreeing to commit a felony.52 The state argued that the present statute,
which focuses on the individual who "agrees with one or more persons,"' 53
adopts a unilateral approach and should be applied to determine a per-
son's culpability without regard to the culpability of alleged co-conspira-
tors. The court, surprisingly, summarily rejected this argument. 54 The
court concluded that despite the wording of the statute, an agreement be-
tween two parties was still required.55 In reaching this conclusion the
48. 646 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
49. The inchoate offenses are described in TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-.05
(Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1984).
50. 646 S.W.2d at 224.
51. Id. at 223;see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon 1974) (criminal conspiracy).
52. The court cited Weathered v. State, 128 Tex. Crim. 263, 81 S.W.2d 91 (1935);
Odneal v. State, 117 Tex. Crim. 97, 34 S.W.2d 595 (1931); and Woodworth v. State, 20 Tex.
App. 375 (1886). 646 S.W.2d at 223. Weathered and Odneal were decided under Tex. Penal
Code art. 1622-29 (1925) (repealed 1974).
53. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1974).
54. 646 S.W.2d at 223-24. The culpability of a conspirator arguably has little to do with
the secret intention of a co-conspirator. Furthermore, the present conspiracy statute closely
resembles the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, which adopts a unilateral ap-
roach to the crimes of conspiracy. See Searcy & Patterson, Practice Commentary, TEX.
ENAL CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon 1974).
55. 646 S.W.2d at 223-24. The Texas State Bar Committee on the Revision of the Penal
Code whose Proposed Revision formed the basis of the present penal code embraced "a
unilateral approach, directing the inquiry to each individual's culpability by formulating the
offense in terms of conduct sufficient to establish the responsibility of a given actor rather
than the conduct of a group." State Bar Comm. on Revision of the Penal Code,,A Proposed
Revision, Final Draft, Oct. 1970, at 136. The Practice Commentary to the annotated statutes
also uses this exact language in describing the unilateral approach of the present statute in
contrast to the prior statute. Searey and Patterson, Practice Commentary, TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon 1974). Given the similarity between the proposed version of § 15.02
and the present statute, the comments in the Practice Commentary to the present statute and
the fact that nearly all jurisdictions with recent penal code codifications have elected to
1984]
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court ignored the legislative history of the Texas conspiracy statute and the
fact that almost all jurisdictions have redefined conspiracy as a unilateral
crime.56
B. Criminal Attempt
Attempt, like conspiracy, is an inchoate crime.57 Since a defendant can-
not be punished for bad thoughts alone,58 the crime of criminal attempt
requires, in addition to a specific intent, some act amounting to more than
mere preparation to carry out the actor's intent.59 Distinguishing between
mere preparation and perpetration of an attempt presents one of the most
troublesome problems in criminal law.60
In McCravy v. State6l the defendant pleaded guilty to the allegations in
his indictment. McCravy claimed on appeal that the indictment failed to
allege an offense because the acts it attributed to him were not sufficient to
constitute an attempt. McCravy's attempted burglary indictment alleged
that McCravy "did. . . attempt to enter a building owned by [another] by
turning off electrical power to said building and climbing to the roof of
said building to gain access, having at the time specific intent to commit
the offense of burglary."'62
On original submission the en banc majority held that the indictment
was fundamentally defective because it failed to allege an act beyond mere
preparation.63 The court reasoned that the required act beyond mere
preparation must tend toward the commission of the particular felony al-
leged. The court concluded: "Because an 'entry' is the gravamen of the
offense . . . the State must allege . . . in an attempted burglary case, that
follow the Model Penal Code recommendation that conspiracy be redefined as a unilateral,
rather than a bilateral (or multilateral) crime, the discussion of the issue in Williams is
inadequate.
56. Perhaps the strongest argument that Texas has not adopted a unilateral approach to
conspiracy was not mentioned in Williams. The proposed penal code specifically dealt with
the problem of feigned agreement in a proposed subsection that was not adopted by the
legislature. The subsection stated: "It is no defense to prosecution for criminal conspiracy
. (3) that the agreement of a purported conspirator was feigned. State Bar Comm.
on Revision of the Penal Code, supra note 55 at 135.
The Committee Commentary to the section that was not adopted stated: "this changes
present law under which . . . the feigning of one conspirator negates the element of a posi-
tive agreement necessary for the offense." See Weathered v. State, 81 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1935); Woodworth v. State, 20 Tex. App. 375 (1886). Both Weathered and Woodworth
were cited by the majority in Williams and because the proposed section was not adopted
these cases may still be good law. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. In light of the
unilateral language that was adopted in defining the crime of conspiracy, the later section on
feigned agreement may have simply seemed unnecessary. Regardless of what result is
reached, the issue is deserving of more careful attention than it received in Williams.
57. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (criminal attempt).
58. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., supra note 21, § 25, at 177-78.
59. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
60. See generally R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 21, at 611-41 (discussing
attempt).
61. 642 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (on rehearing).
62. Id. at 452.
63. Id. at 457-58.
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the accused committed an act which tended but failed to effect the com-
mission of the intended burglary, as opposed to some other offense
... *64 Although climbing to the roof and turning off the power were
acts, they were not acts that tended to effect an intrusion or entry to the
building.
On motion for rehearing the court reversed its earlier opinion and af-
firmed McCravy's conviction.65 The court stated that the earlier opinion
imposed a last proximate act test for judging the sufficiency of an act for
criminal attempt, and noted that although the line between mere prepara-
tion and attempt was necessarily a gray area, allegation and proof of the
last act was not necessary. 66 Although this case was a very close question
that fell into this gray area, the court found allegations that the defendant
turned off electrical power and climbed to the roof sufficient to constitute
attempted burglary. 67
In Exparte Buggs68 the court considered the other required element of
criminal attempt, the specific intent to commit a particular felony.69 The
practice commentary to section 15.01 states that the attempt statute applies
in conjunction with all offenses in the Penal Code, in contrast to prior
codes that contained only specific attempt provisions related to particular
offenses. 70 Analytical difficulties arise when this general attempt statute,
which requires specific intent, is overlayed upon a statutory offense that
requires a lesser culpable mental state. The court of criminal appeals held
in Gonzales v. State7l that the crime of attempted involuntary manslaugh-
ter did not exist, since an attempt required a specific intent and
"[i]nvoluntary manslaughter negates any specific intent to kill. '' 72 In
Buggs the applicant in a habeas corpus proceeding had been charged with
attempted murder but had been convicted of the lesser included offense of
attempted voluntary manslaughter. The applicant, relying on Gonzales,
argued that the crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter did not exist.
The court of criminal appeals disagreed. Unlike involuntary manslaugh-
ter, voluntary manslaughter is an intent or knowledge crime distinguished
from the crime of murder only by the existence of an immediate influence
of sudden passion.73 This circumstance does not negate the actor's intent
64. Id at 456 n.23 (emphasis in original).
65. Id at 462.
66. Id. at 459-60. According to the American Law Institute, no Anglo-American juris-
diction adheres to the last proximate act test, which requires that the last proximate act
essential to a crime occur before an attempt can be charged. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01
comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
67. 642 S.W.2d at 460. For other cases during the survey period pertaining to the suffi-
ciency of an act for criminal attempt, see Hall v. State, 640 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Crim. App.
1982); Hise v. State, 640 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Hudson v. State, 638 S.W.2d
450 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1982, pet. re'd).
68. 644 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
69. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
70. Searcy & Patterson, Practice Commentary, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01 (Vernon
1974).
71. 532 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
72. Id. at 345.
73. 644 S.W.2d at 750; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04(a) (Vernon 1974).
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to kill, but is like a defense to murder that reduces the offense to voluntary
manslaughter. 74 Thus, the court held that if the unsuccessful attempt to
cause the death of another is "generated by immediate influence of sudden
passion caused by provocation from the intended victim"' 75 there can be an
attempted voluntary manslaughter.76
III. CULPABLE MENTAL STATES AND STRICT LIABILITY
4. To Which Elements Does the Mens Rea Apply?
Determining to which elements of an offense the prescribed culpable
mental state applies presents a recurrent problem in both inchoate and
completed crimes. An assault is aggravated when the defendant "causes
bodily injury to a peace officer when he knows or has been informed the
person assaulted is a peace officer . . . while the peace officer is lawfully
discharging an official duty. ' 77 The defendant must know that the victim
is a peace officer, but must the defendant also know that the officer was
lawfully discharging an official duty? Under the former code, worded
slightly differently,78 the defendant had to know both facts. 79 In Salazar v.
State,80 however, the court overruled precedent and held that under the
current statute the defendant need not have known that the peace officer
was discharging an official duty.81
Because the legislature rejected a proposed general statutory provision
that would have made the culpable mental state required in a section ap-
plicable to each element of the offense described in the section, 82 courts
74. See Braudrick v. State, 572 S.W.2d 709, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
75. 644 S.W.2d at 750.
76. Id. For a decision from another jurisdiction holding that attempted voluntary man-
slaughter is not a possible crime, see People v. Weeks, 86 I11. App. 2d 480, 230 N.E.2d 12, 14
(1967), in which the court stated that:
the "intent" required for conviction of the offense of attempt must be a "spe-
cific intent" ... that constitutes ... some calculation on the part of the ac-
cused. Voluntary manslaughter, on the other hand precludes any calculation
but can result only from "a sudden and intense passion." ... An act cannot
be both the result of a "sudden and intense passion" and a calculated goal of
prior deliberations.
At first blush, Buggs and Weeks appear to disagree. Both opinions, however, are correct
under their respective penal codes. Unlike Illinois, no prior calculation is required for mur-
der under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1974) so long as intent or knowl-
edge is present. Also, the element of sudden passion is merely a mitigating circumstance
that reduces the crime to manslaughter, rather than an element that negates the required
mental state for murder as in Illinois. For a discussion of the two different views of murder
and manslaughter and the historical basis of the split, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,
692-96 (1975).
77. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
78. Tex. Penal Code art. 1147(i) (1925) (repealed 1974) (an assault was aggravated
when "committed upon an officer in the lawful discharge of the duties of his office, if it was
known or declared to the offender that the person assaulted was an officer discharging an
official duty").
79. Crow v. State, 152 Tex. Crim. 586, 216 S.W.2d 201 (1949).
80. 643 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
81. Id. at 956.




must decide the issue on a case-by-case basis. In Lugo-Lugo v. State 83 a
panel of the court of criminal appeals held, on rehearing, that murder
under Penal Code section 19.02(a)(2) 84 required two mental states: a spe-
cific intent to cause serious bodily harm, and knowledge or intent that the
defendant's voluntary act was clearly dangerous to human life.85 The in-
dictment alleged that the defendant intended to cause serious bodily harm,
but failed to allege that he intentionally or knowingly performed an act
clearly dangerous to human life. The panel, therefore, reversed the
conviction. 86
The court of criminal appeals granted the state's motion for rehearing
and, sitting en banc, reversed the panel decision. 87 The court reasoned
that "intent to cause death" under section 19.02(a)(1)88 focuses
upon the result and does not impose any limitation on the manner or
means by which death is achieved. Ergo, if with the intent to cause
death, an individual throws a small stone at an individual and kills
him, the perpetrator is guilty of murder notwithstanding that the act
resulting in the death was not clearly dangerous to human life.89
Serious bodily injury homicide under section 19.02(a)(2) is likewise a "re-
sult" type of crime, committed when a person who intends to cause serious
bodily injury commits an act that is objectively clearly dangerous to
human life. 90 In other words, intent modifies serious bodily injury but not
an act clearly dangerous to human life. 91
The case-by-case determination of the applicability of culpable mental
states to various elements of a particular offense sometimes leads to results
that are difficult to reconcile. In Ex parte Smith92 the court of criminal
appeals made explicit what was previously implicit about the required
mens rea for theft; specifically, that "there is no required culpability in the
83. 650 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (on rehearing).
84. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1974) provides:
A person commits an offense if he: ...(2) intends to cause serious bodily
injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the
death of an individual ....
85. 650 S.W.2d at 81.
86. Id at 74.
87. Id at 85.
88. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1974) provides that "[a] person com-
mits an offense if he: (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual."
89. 650 S.W.2d at 81 (emphasis in original). The exclusive focus on intent ignores the
fact that murder under § 19.02(a)(1) may be committed intentionally or knowingly. The
court's example of the stone is correct; the defendant is guilty for desiring and causing the
result even if he is surprised at the outcome because the act is not dangerous. The converse,
however, is also true. Even if a person is indifferent to, but does not desire to kill passengers
on a plane on which he has placed a bomb in order to obtain insurance proceeds for some of
the plane's cargo, the defendant is nonetheless guilty of murder if the bomb causes death
because the actor knew that the passengers' deaths were almost certain to occur due to the
manner or means used to accomplish his objective.
90. 650 S.W.2d at 81.
91. Id. Lugo-Lugo was applied in later cases during the survey period. See Allen v.
State, 651 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Peterson v. State, No. A14-82-789 CR (Tex.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] June 16, 1983).
92. 645 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
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offense of theft. . . beyond that of a specific intent to deprive the owner of
property. '93 Thus, the state need not allege or prove that the defendant's
appropriation of property, done with intent to deprive the owner of the
property, is intended or known to be without the effective consent of the
owner. In the offense of credit card abuse, however, Penal Code section
32.31(b)(1)(A) 94 requires that the person who intends to obtain property
fraudulently know that the card has not been issued to him and that he
does not have the holder's effective consent to use the card. 95 In Exparte
Wite96 the court vacated a credit card abuse conviction because the in-
dictment, which alleged "intent to fraudulently obtain property and serv-
ices . . . without the effective consent of the Complainant, knowing that
the credit card had not been issued to the Defendant, ' 97 was fundamen-
tally defective. The defect lay in the indictment's failure to allege that the
defendant knew he did not have the owner's effective consent to use the
card.
The fact that the owner's lack of effective consent need not be known to
the defendant to support a conviction for theft, but is required to establish
the offense of credit card abuse, can be rationally explained by the differ-
ent wording of the two statutes. 98 The differing results, however, seem dif-
ficult to reconcile in light of the similarities of the two statutes. Credit card
abuse under this part of the statute99 is a specific type of theft. As the
Practice Commentary points out, this portion of the credit card abuse stat-
ute "represents a departure from the general consolidation of theft offenses
under Chapter 31 . . . the conduct specified in Subsections (b)(1) and (11)
93. Id at 312. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (theft) pro-
vides: "A person commits an offense if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to
deprive the owner of property. (b) Appropriation . . . is unlawful if: (1) it is without the
owner's effective consent; or (2) the property is stolen and the actor appropriates the prop-
erty knowing it was stolen by another."
94. Id. § 32.3 1(b)(l)(A) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A person commits an offense if: (1)
with intent to obtain property or service fraudulently, he presents or uses a credit card with
knowledge that: (A) the card, whether or not expired, has not been issued to him and is not
used with the effective consent of the cardholder . I..." Id
95. See Exparte White, 644 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Exparte Sharpe, 581
S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Baker v. State, 593 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
The different wording of the theft and credit card abuse statutes supports the finding of
different mens rea requirements. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.31(b)(l)(A)
(Vernon 1974); with id. § 31.03(a), (b). The differing results reached under the two statutes
are hard to reconcile, however, in light of the similarity of the crimes. Credit card abuse
under § 32.31 (b)(l)(A) is a specific type of theft. See Searcy & Patterson, Practice Commen-
tary, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.31 (Vernon 1974). As such, it should have the same
mens rea requirements as other theft offenses.
96. 644 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no pet.).
97. Id. at 489 (emphasis in original).
98. The credit card abuse statute specifies an intent to obtain property or service fraudu-
lently and knowledge that the card has not been issued to him and is not used with the
effective consent of the holder. Theft by contrast specifies only an intent to deprive the
owner of the property. As a matter of logic and grammar, the additional knowledge require-
ment in credit card abuse can apply to the element of the effective consent of the owner.
99. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.3 1(b)(1)(A) (Vernon 1974).
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clearly is theft under Section 31.03 [theft]."' °
In contrast to Ex parte White, knowledge of the owner's consent was
held not to be an element of the offense involved in Thomas v. State.'0'
Thomas claimed that Penal Code section 31.07102 required the state to
prove that he knew that the vehicle he stole belonged to the complainant.
The court rejected this argument and found that the state had only to
prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally operated the vehi-
cle.' 0 3 This decision effectively made section 31.07 a strict liability offense,
because virtually everyone who operates a vehicle does so knowingly or
intentionally. Under Thomas, one who borrows a stolen car under the
false impression that the lender owns it is subject to criminal prosecution.
B. Strict Liability Offenses
Penal Code section 6.02(b) requires that a culpable mental state of in-
tent, knowledge, or recklessness be read into any penal statute in which no
mens rea is specified, unless the definition plainly dispenses with any
mental element."°4 When a mental state requirement is read into a statute,
ambiguity as to which elements it applies to can remain. In Diggles v.
State 0 5 the court read a mens rea requirement, knowledge, into a voter
assistance statute that contained no express mens rea requirement. 0 6 The
defendant argued that the knowledge requirement should apply not only
to the conduct proscribed by the statute, but also to the statutory exemp-
tion for election clerks and judges. She claimed that the state should have
to prove that she knew she was not a clerk, deputy clerk, or judge. The
court held, however, that the required mental state applied only to the
conduct proscribed by the statute. 0 7
In Exxon Company U. SA. v. State 0 8 the state prosecuted Exxon for the
offense of air pollution. Exxon argued that the provisions of section
100. Searey & Patterson, Practice Commentary, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.31 (Vernon
1974).
101. 646 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1982, no pet.).
102. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07 (Vernon 1974). This section makes it illegal to
operate intentionally or knowingly another's boat, airplane, or motor-propelled vehicle
without the owner's consent. Id.
103. 646 S.W.2d at 566-67. But see Lynch v. State, 643 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Crim. App.
1983), decided two weeks after Thomas, where the defendant presented evidence of his mis-
taken belief that the person from whom he had borrowed the vehicle was the owner. The
court of criminal appeals reversed the conviction because of the failure of the trial court to
instruct the jury on the defense of mistake of fact under TEX PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.02
(Vernon 1974).
104. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b) (Vernon 1974).
105. 641 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, pet. ref'd).
106. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 15.30(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides in part:
In any single election, it is unlawful for a person, other than a clerk or dep-
uty clerk for absentee voting or an election judge or clerk at a regular polling
place, to assist in preparing the ballot of more than five voters who are not
related as parent, grandparents, spouse, child, brother, or sister to the person
rendering the assistance.
107. 641 S.W.2d at 669.
108. 646 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1982, pet. ref d).
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6.02(b) should be applied to the air pollution statute even though that stat-
ute was outside the Penal Code. Although the court of appeals agreed that
the statute applied to offenses outside the Penal Code, it held that the legis-
lature had dispensed with a culpable mental state requirement for air pol-
lution statute violators. 0 9 After noting that the statute had been
transferred from the Penal Code to the civil statutes, "l0 the court reasoned
that "if the Legislature had intended to require proof of a culpable mental
state, it could have done so easily when it amended the statute and trans-
ferred it from the Penal Code to the civil statutes.""' Also, in other cases
that applied the provisions of section 6.02 to statutes outside the Penal
Code, "the nature of the offense required that an identifiable person be
aware of a situation."' 12 Air pollution cases involving corporations would
be difficult to prosecute if the crime required a culpable mental state, be-
cause of the difficulty in charging one person with responsibility for caus-
ing the problem. The court concluded that "[c]onsidering the risks to
public health, to require anything other than a strict liability standard
would be to deny the public the right to be protected from hazardous
activities." 113
Two courts resolved differently the issue of whether an offense was strict
liability or whether a culpable mental state was required pursuant to sec-
tion 6.02(b) in cases that involved similar statutes. In Bryant v. State 14 the
court reversed a conviction for driving with a suspended license because
the indictment failed to allege a culpable mental state.' '5 Though the stat-
ute required no mens rea, the court read a knowledge of suspension re-
quirement into it because the statute did not readily reveal a legislative
intent to eliminate mens rea. 116 In Clayton v. State,' '7 however, the court
affirmed the defendant's conviction for driving with a suspended li-
cense, 1,8 despite the state's failure to allege a culpable mental state for the
109. 646 S.W.2d at 538.
110. The air pollution legislation was located at Tex. Penal Code art. 698d, §§ 1-6 (1925)
(repealed 1974).
I1I. 646 S.W.2d at 538 (citing Exparte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)).
The court based its analysis on American Plant Food Corp. v. State, 587 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979) (involving a water pollution statute); Exparte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979) (involving a water pollution statute).
112. 646 S.W.2d at 538.
113. Id
114. 643 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no pet.).
115. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701(h), § 32(c) (Vernon 1977). The statute
provides:
Any person whose license or registration or non-resident's operating privilege
has been suspended or revoked under this Act and who, during such suspen-
sion or revocation drives any motor vehicle upon any highway ...shall be
fined not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500) or imprisoned not exceeding
six (6) months, or both.
Id.
116. 643 S.W.2d at 242.
117. 652 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no pet.).
118. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687(b), § 34 (Vernon 1977). The statute provides:
Any person whose operator's, commercial operator's, or chauffeur's license or
driving privilege as a nonresident has been cancelled, suspended, or revoked
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offense. The court based the result on the conclusion that section 6.02(b)
was inapplicable because "this offense is one of those where the legislature
intended to and has dispensed with a culpable mental state.",19
IV. PRESUMPTIONS
Statutes may contain presumptions to ease the state's burden of proof.
Thus, although the Bryant court required the prosecution to prove that the
defendant knew his license had been suspended, the prosecution's burden
was eased by a statutory presumption in article 6701(h).120 The statute
states that notice of license suspension "shall be presumed to be complete
upon the expiration of nine (9) days after [notice from the Department] is
deposited in the United States mail."' 2' In Rogers v. State122 the court
upheld this presumption against the defendant's claim that the presump-
tion was unconstitutional. The defendant argued that no rational connec-
tion existed between mailing and receipt of notice, and that the
presumption, therefore, impermissibly shifted the burden of proving the
required mental state to the defendant.123
A statutory presumption in the Texas obscenity statute 24 did not fare as
well as the presumption upheld in Rogers. Section (e) of the statute pro-
vides that: "A person who promotes ...obscene material ... in the
course of his business is presumed to do so with knowledge of its content
and character."' 25 In Davis v. State 126 the court of criminal appeals found
this presumption unconstitutional as a violation of the first amendment.1 27
The court relied on Smith v. California, 128 which declared unconstitutional
a Los Angeles ordinance imposing strict liability upon a bookseller found
in possession of obscene material. Although Smith reaffirmed that obscene
material was not protected by the first amendment, the court found the
ordinance unconstitutional because of its chilling effect on protected first
as provided in this Act, and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways
of this State while such license or privilege is cancelled, suspended, or revoked
is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of
not less than Twenty-five Dollars ($25) nor more than Five Hundred Dollars
($500), and, in addition, there shall be imposed a sentence of imprisonment of
not less than seventy-two (72) hours nor more than six (6) months.
Id.
119. 652 S.W.2d at 812.
120. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701(h), § 31 (Vernon 1977).
121. Id.
122. 641 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no pet.).
123. Id. at 406.
124. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.23 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
125. Id. § 43.23(e). Id § 43.21(5) defines "promote" as "to manufacture, issue, sell, give,
provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmit, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate,
present, exhibit, or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the same."
126. 658 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
127. Id at 578. The court also stated that the presumption violated due process because:
(1) it lacked a rational connection between the basic fact and the presumed fact; and (2) it
tended to displace the burden of proof. Id at 580.
128. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
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amendment material. 29 The Texas obscenity statute, as opposed to the
ordinance in Smith, contains a knowledge requirement. Without the statu-
tory presumption, however, the state could not have proved this element in
Davis.130 The trouble with the presumption was that it tended to convert
the obscenity statute into the kind of strict liability offense condemned in
Smith. The presumption, even if permissive or rebuttable, fostered the
self-censorship problem because "no matter . . . how numerous and va-
ried the publications or the films . . . inside the premises, an owner,
proprieter, exhibitor, manager, or clerk is subject to conviction solely be-
cause of the presumption. . . . The risk of suppressing freedom of expres-
sion is not just negligible . . . it rises to astronomical proportions."' 3 1
Two weeks prior to the Davis opinion, the court of criminal appeals re-
jected an opportunity to reach the same holding that it issued in Davis. In
Skinner v. State132 the court of appeals [hereinafter Skinner ,] reversed a
conviction under the obscenity statute on the same grounds later adopted
in Davis.133 On discretionary review, however, the court of criminal ap-
peals held that the court of appeals "was correct in reversing appellant's
conviction . . . although we disagree as to the reasons the Court of Ap-
peals used to reach the result it did."' 34 According to the court, it was
unnecessary for the lower court to reach the constitutionality of the pre-
sumption because a review of the record showed that no rational trier of
fact could have found appellant guilty.35 This conclusion was apparently
based upon the weak evidence, or absence of evidence, of Skinner's knowl-
edge of the obscene nature of the film: the defendant, a student, had only
worked at the theatre one month during hours that fit her school schedule;
she had no managerial duties or financial interest in the theatre; she had
nothing to do with the operation of the film or the selection of films to be
shown; she merely sold tickets and popcorn and performed miscellaneous
duties like cleaning the theatre. 36 Yet two weeks later in Davis, the
threshold finding that the evidence was insufficient absent the presump-
tion, made it necessary to review the statutory presumption of knowledge
because the only way the trier of fact could conclude that Davis had
knowledge of the character and content of the film was through the pre-
sumption. 137 In fact, the converse to the court of criminal appeals decision
in Skinner [hereinafter Skinner II] was held to be true a few months later
129. Id. at 154.
130. 658 S.W.2d at 576. The only evidence against Davis was the fact that he was the
only employee present in the bookstore and that he gave change to an undercover officer
who then viewed an obscene film in one of the store's peepshow booths. The Davis court
concluded that "the only way one could conclude that appellant [Davis] had knowledge of
the character and content of the film ... is through the presumption contained in subsec-
tion 43.23(e)." Id.
131. Id. at 578-79.
132. 647 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982).
133. See supra note 127.
134. Skinner v. State, 652 S.W.2d 773, 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
135. Id. at 776.
136. Id. at 775.
137. 658 S.W.2d at 576.
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in Hall v. Stale. 38
In Hall evidence of the defendant's guilt under the obscenity statute was
so overwhelming that the evidence was sufficient even without the pre-
sumptions. 39 Thus the Court of Criminal Appeals held that it was error
for the same court of appeals that decided Skinner I to reverse the convic-
tion on the basis of the unconstitutional statutory presumptions. 40 One
can only sympathize with the hapless court of appeals that was scolded
twice for reaching the merits; once because the evidence was insufficient
without the presumption, and once because evidence was sufficient without
the presumption. A further irony is that the decision on the merits in both
Skinner I and Hall, which the higher court disavowed on discretionary
review, reached the same result as did the court of criminal appeals in
Davis, which even adopted the reasoning of the Skinner I opinion by
reference. 141
In referring to the court of appeals decision in Skinner, the court of
criminal appeals stated in Davis that it had reversed Skinner 1.142 Not
only is this statement wrong--Skinner I was affirmed not reversed; only
the lower court's analysis was rejected-it was also unfortunate. By failing
to explicitly admit error in refusing to reach the merits of the constitutional
issue in Skinner II, the court failed to clarify that the insufficiency of evi-
dence concerning the presumed fact is no reason to fail to review a pre-
sumption's constitutionality. In fact, as the court of criminal appeals later
acknowledged in Davis insufficient evidence concerning the presumed fact
makes review of the presumption imperative, because only the existence of
the presumption can explain and support the verdict.
When Skinner I was belatedly adopted in Davis, the decision was char-
acterized as "a well written discussion of the usual rules governing the
construction of the usual and ordinary presumptions .... ,,143 As was
previously discussed, the treatment of the presumption in Davis was al-
most entirely devoted to explaining why the presumption in question was
not "usual," but was one that infringed upon first amendment rights. 44
The more traditional reasons, adopted from Skinner I, were merely listed
in conclusionary fashion in Davis:145
[First] it cannot be stated with reason and substantial assurance that
the presumed fact [defendant's knowledge of the character and con-
tent of obscene material] is always more likely than not to flow from
138. 661 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), rev'g Hall v. State, 646 S.W.2d 489 (Tex.
App-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983).
139. 661 S.W.2d at 102. Unlike the defendant in Skinner who had no managerial role at
the theatre, Hall was the admitted manager who personally promoted the sale of dildos at a
concession stand.
140. Id
141. 658 S.W.2d at 576.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 579.
144. Id. at 578-79.
145. Id. at 580. Because Davis adopted the opinion of the court of appeals in Skinner I,
by reference some of the discussion that follows will refer to Skinner's analysis.
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the proved fact ["promotion" of the obscene material in the course of
defendant's business] upon which it is made to depend. [Second] it
[the presumption] tends to displace the burden of proof.146
Davis should have been limited to its cogent analysis of the first amend-
ment issue. Reliance on the remaining grounds, adopted from Skinner I,
was unnecessary and ill-advised. The court did not specify whether the
burden of proof, which the presumption tended to displace, was a produc-
tion or persuasion burden or both. Regardless, the statement is incorrect.
By virtue of Texas Penal Code section 2.05,147 all statutory presump-
tions are permissive inferences or permissive presumptions. The jury is
instructed that it may find the presumed fact, upon proof of the fact giving
rise to the presumption, but is not required to do so. Unlike mandatory
presumptions, which involve an inherent shift in the burden of production
or persuasion, 48 permissive inferences do not require the defendant to
bring forward any evidence. The required permissiveness of presumptions
in Texas was enforced by several cases decided during the survey period in
which convictions were reversed, even in the absence of an objection, be-
cause of the trial court's failure to instruct the jury consistent with the re-
quirements of section 2.05.149
The rationale for concluding that the permissive inference at issue in
Davis unconstitutionally shifted some burden of proof to the defendant
was that "the only effective way for a defendant to rebut this presumption
is by taking the stand in his own defense and attempting to prove his lack
of knowledge ... , This analysis confuses the defendant's desire for
146. Id at 580.
147. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN § 2.05 (Vernon 1974). The statute provides:
When this code or another penal law establishes a presumption with respect
to any fact, it has the following consequences:
(1) if there is sufficient evidence of the facts that give rise to the presump-
tion, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact must be submitted to the
jury, unless the court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly precludes
a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the presumed fact; and
(2) if the existence of the presumed fact is submitted to the jury, the court
shall charge the jury, in terms of the presumption and the specific element to
which it applies, as follows:
(A) that the facts giving rise to the presumption must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt;
(B) that if such facts are proven beyond a reasonable doubt the jury
may find that the element of the offense sought to be presumed exists, but is
not bound to so find;
(C) that even though the jury may find the existence of such element,
the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the other elements of
the offense charged; and
(D) if the jury has a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a fact or
facts giving rise to the presumption, the presumption fails and the jury shall
not consider the presumption for any purpose.
Id
148. See Hardesty v. State, 656 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). If the presump-
tion shifts a persuasion burden it is unconstitutional. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 140
(1979).
149. See Coberly v. State, 644 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Goswick v. State, 656
S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Jones v. State, 658 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
150. 647 S.W.2d at 691. This issue was not discussed in Davis except for its adoption by
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an acquittal with legal requirements of the burdens of production and per-
suasion. In a case without a presumption, if the State presents volumes of
evidence highly probative of the defendant's guilt of every element of an
offense, the defendant will feel pressure to present evidence that will cast
doubt on the State's proof on one or more of the elements in order to avoid
a conviction. That does not mean, however, that the State's duty to pro-
duce evidence that persuades the fact finder has shifted to the defendant
on any of the required elements of the offense. 151 Permissive inferences
should be subject to careful appellate review,' 52 but they are not vulnera-
ble to attack on the ground of an unconstitutional shift in the burden of
proof.
It is precisely because permissive inferences shift no burden to the de-
fendant that they have been given favored treatment on appellate review.
In County Court of Ulster County v. Allen 153 the United States Supreme
Court held that mandatory presumptions are to be reviewed "facially" to
determine if a rational connection exists between the basic fact, or the fact
giving rise to the presumption, and the presumed fact. By "facial" the
court referred to review based on the face of the statute without resort to
the particular facts in the case. 154 In contrast, permissive inferences may
be sustained in a rational connection review if the evidence at trial sup-
ports the jury's finding on the presumed fact even if the presumption
would be irrational in general experience or in some hypothetical situa-
tion. 55 This type of review in light of the evidence is called "applied re-
view." 156 Although all statutory presumptions in Texas are permissive,
Davis failed to utilize an applied review. The court stated that it could not
be said that the presumed fact is always more likely than not to flow from
the presumed fact on which it is made to depend."'' 57 The use of the word
''always" suggests a review divorced from the facts of the case rather than
an applied review. Furthermore, the language used by the court was taken
from Leary v. United States,' 58 which involved the review of a mandatory
presumption. 159 Davis should have limited the basis of its holding to the
first amendment issue and the court of criminal appeals should clarify its
reference of Skinner I. For this reason, the rationale discussed here is derived from Skinner
1.
151. In fact, the burden of persuasion cannot be shifted constitutionally to the defendant.
See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 140 (1979); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
152. See Schmolesky, County Court of Ulster County v. Allen and Sandstrom v. Montana.
The Supreme Court Lends an Ear But Turns Its Face, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 261, 295-304
(1981).
153. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
154. Id. at 155-56.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 658 S.W.2d at 580.
158. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
159. For a critique of the characterization of Leary as a mandatory presumption and the
use of a lesser standard of review for permissive inferences, see generally Schmolesky, supra
note 152. If the use of facial review for the permissive inference in Davis was a decision to
reject the diminished applied review standard of Allen on the ground that the Texas Consti-
tution requires a more stringent standard, it would be salutary. No basis for this conclusion
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treatment of burden of proof and rational connection issues in future pre-
sumption cases.
Section 2.05 of the Penal Code, enforced by cases holding that the fail-
ure to instruct the jury consistent with the statute is reversible error even in
the absence of objection, 60 insures that statutory presumptions in Texas
are permissive inferences. The same may not be true, however, for judi-
cially created presumptions or inferences.
Schenk v. State 16' involved the familiar common law presumption that
one is presumed guilty of theft or burglary if he possesses recently stolen
property.' 62 Schenk argued that the trial court erred by instructing the
jury on the presumption or inference without properly charging the jury
under section 2.05,163 even though he had not objected to the instruction at
trial. The court of appeals affirmed, distinguishing the cases holding that
the failure to instruct the jury under section 2.05 is fundamental error, on
the basis that the statute applies only to statutory presumptions and not to
judicially created ones. 164
Hardesty v. State, 65 decided three months after Schenk, casts doubt on
Schenk's continuing validity. Although Hardesty did not deal with in-
structions under section 2.05 or mention Schenk, the court stated that the
same judicially created presumption charged in Schenk was more correctly
characterized as a permissive inference. 166 Hardesty may presage that the
court intends to treat all presumptions as permissive inferences, whether
legislatively or judicially created.
V. SPECIFIC PENAL CODE PROVISIONS
A. Aggravated Possession of Marqiuana-Inadequate Caption
The court of criminal appeals declared several Penal Code provisions
unconstitutional in 1983. In Ex parte Crisp' 6 7 the court declared an
exists, however, since Allen and the difference between facial and applied review is not dis-
cussed. 658 S.W.2d at 580.
160. See supra note 149.
161. 652 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1983, pet. refd).
162. Other cases decided during the survey period discussing this judicially created pre-
sumption include: Hynson v. State, 656 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Jackson v.
State, 645 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Jordan v. State, 658 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1983, no pet.); Cantu v. State, 655 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no
pet.); Hite v. State, 653 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 650 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
163. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.05 (Vernon Supp. 1984); see supra note 147 (text of
statute).
164. 652 S.W.2d at 512. The court emphasized the prefatory words of § 2.05: "When
this code or another penal law establishes a presumption .
165. 656 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
166. Id. at 76. The term "presumption" has been used throughout this Article as a ge-
neric term that includes conclusive, mandatory, and permissive devices. In Hardesty the
court of criminal appeals stated that although in prior cases it had used the term presump-
tion to refer to the inference of guilt from possession of recently stolen property, it now
disavowed that usage and stated that the proper term was permissive inference. Id. at 76-77.




amendment to the Controlled Substances Act 168 unconstitutional although
the act it amended was held to remain in effect. H.B. 730169 created two
levels of offenses for possession of marijuana in addition to the three levels
already contained in the in the Controlled Substances Act. 170 The most
serious of the new offenses created was aggravated possession for posses-
sion of more than 50 pounds of the substance. Crisp and his codefendants
were charged with aggravated possession under indictments alleging that
each of them possessed more than 2000 pounds of marijuana. In pretrial
writs of habeas corpus Crisp and his codefendants alleged that the caption
to H.B. 730 violated the Texas Constitution, article III, section 35171 since
it failed to provide adequate notice of the major changes contained in the
body of the bill. The caption stated simply: "An Act relating to offenses
and criminal penalties under the Texas Controlled Substances Act."' 172
The trial court denied the defendant's claims, but the court of appeals
agreed with the defendants. The appellate court pointed out that the cap-
tion made several changes in the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal
Procedure, and found that the caption inadequately described the ten new
sections H.B. 730 added to the Controlled Substances Act. 173 The court,
however, denied the defendants' petitions for writs of habeas corpus be-
cause the indictment alleging possession of over 2000 pounds alleged an
offense under the pre-amendment Controlled Substances Act.' 74 The deci-
sion benefitted the defendants, for they were subject only to the penalty
level in the unamended act. ' 75 In its plurality affirmance the court of crim-
inal appeals stated: "Since the caption refers to one act and has the effect
of modifying at least two other separate statutes not mentioned in the cap-
tion, it does not give readers fair notice of the subject matter contained
within the bill."'176 The plurality rejected the dissent's argument that the
fair notice standard should be limited to a determination that the caption
is not fraudulent. 177 The dissent warned that the decision would jeopard-
168. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1984).
169. Act of Sept. 1, 1981, ch. 268, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 696.
170. See 643 S.W.2d at 489.
171. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 35. That section provides:
No bill . . . shall contain more than one subject, which shall be expressed in
its title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act, which shall not be
expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof, as shall
not be so expressed.
Id
172. 643 S.W.2d at 489.
173. Id. at 490.
174. Id at 492. Prior to H.B. 730 possession of more than four ounces of marijuana was
an offense.
175. Id at 489. The amendment authorized imprisonment for life or a term of not less
than 15 or more than 99 years as opposed to the unamended statutory maximum of two to
ten years and a $5000 fine. Id.
176. 661 S.W.2d at 947.
177. Id. Crisp will have little impact on prosecutions under the Controlled Substances
Act because of the holding that the original act is still valid as it stood prior to passage of
H.B. 730. See Prescott v. State, No. 2-82-130-CR (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Nov. 9, 1983, no
pet.).
In two cases decided during the survey period but before Ex parte Crisp, the court of
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ize hundreds of statutes.
B. Harassment, Alcohol, and Drugs- Vagueness and Related Problems
In Kramer v. Price 178 a federal habeas corpus applicant claimed that the
Texas harassment statute' 79 was too vague to give fair notice of what was
prohibited. Kramer attacked the part of the statute that states: "(a) A
person commits an offense if he intentionally: (1) communicates by tele-
phone or in writing in vulgar, profane, obscene, or indecent language or in
a coarse and offensive manner and by this action intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly annoys or alarms the recipient . . ," 180 The court of crimi-
nal appeals affirmed Kramer's conviction under the statute, 18' but a fed-
eral district court granted Kramer's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 82
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the issuance of the writ, 183 relying on Coates v.
City of Cincinnati.'84 Coates involved a city ordinance that, like the Texas
harassment statute, used the word "annoy." The United States Supreme
Court held that the word "annoy" presented some inherent vagueness 85
and that, more importantly, the ordinance did not specify and the state
courts "did not indicate upon whose sensitivity a violation does depend-
the sensitivity of the judge or jury, the sensitivity of the arresting officer, or
the sensitivity of a hypothetical reasonable man."' 86
The Texas harassment statute suffered from the same problems as did
the statute in Coates. It used the vague term "annoy," and Texas courts
had not construed the statute to indicate whose sensitivities must be of-
fended. 87 For this reason the Fifth Circuit rejected the state's argument
that any vagueness had been alleviated by the requirement of proof of the
actor's intent to harass. 88 Despite the required mental state, statutes like
criminal appeals rejected inadequate caption claims. See Nichols v. State, 653 S.W.2d 768
(Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (reh'g denied 1983) (relating to TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02
(Vernon Supp. 1984) (organized crime activity)); Buxton v. State, 646 S.W.2d 445 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983) (relating to TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.06(d) (Vernon 1974) (accomplice
witness provision in section on prostitution)).
178. 712 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1983).
179. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (Vernon 1974). The statute was amended by H.B.
838 in an attempt to alleviate the vagueness problems of the old statute. See Act of Sept. 1,
1981, ch. 411, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2204-06.
180. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(1) (Vernon 1974).
181. 605 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
182. 712 F.2d at 174. The grant of habeas corpus was unpublished.
183. Id at 178.
184. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
185. "Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is
vague . . . in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." Id at 614.
186. Id at 613.
187. 712 F.2d at 178. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the words
"annoy" and "alarm" are not vague but are words of common usage needing no definition.
Kramer v. State, 605 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Collection Consultants Inc. v.
State, 556 S.W.2d 787, 793-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
188. 712 F.2d at 178. Judge Rubin, in dissent, agreed with the state's claim: "The possi-
bility of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement is minimal because the statute requires that
the state prove not only that the recipient was annoyed or alarmed but also that the commu-
nicator intentionally or recklessly caused the perturbation." 712 F.2d at 180.
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the one in Coates were vague because the standard of conduct they speci-
fied depends on each complainant's sensitivity.' 89
In Wishnow v. State 90 the court held the word "vulgar" in the Alcoholic
Beverage Code to be impermissibly vague, but found the word "lewd" suf-
ficiently clear with the aid of definitions in other statutes.' 9' The defend-
ant was convicted under a part of the Alcoholic Beverage Code that
prohibited persons authorized to sell beer at retail to permit "lewd or vul-
gar entertainment or acts."' 192 Though the statutes define "lewd,"' 193
neither they nor the Penal Code define the word "vulgar." The meanings
of "vulgar" range from "plebian or coarse" to "lewdly or profanely inde-
cent."' 94 Because the statute in question proscribed permitting lewd or
vulgar entertainment, the state could merely have alleged that the en-
tertainment was lewd. Because the state alleged and the court charged that
conviction was authorized if the permitted entertainment was lewd or vul-
gar, however, the conviction was based on an unconstitutionally vague
standard of conduct. The court of appeals therefore reversed the
conviction. 95
Closely related to the void for vagueness doctrine is the ex post facto
problem created by an unforeseeable judicial interpretation that enlarges
the scope of a penal statute. 96 This problem arose in Chalin v. State 197 in
which the defendant was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance,
phentermine, an isomer of methamphetamine. The defendant delivered
the substance several months before the court decision in Ex parte Ash-
croft, 19 8 which was the first authoritative holding that possession of
phentermine could be punished as possession of an isomer of
methamphetamine.1 99 The court reviewed judicial and executive action
taken prior to 4shcroft and reversed Chalin's conviction, holding that the
construction in Ashcroft was so unforeseeable that it would be a denial of
due process to apply it retroactively to an act committed prior to that
decision. 2°°
189. Id..
190. 638 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, pet. granted).
191. Id. at 84.
192. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 104.01(6) (Vernon 1978).
193. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.07(3) (Vernon 1974) (describing public lewdness
as "an act of sexual contact").
194. 638 S.W.2d at 84.
195. Id. at 84-85.
196. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
197. 645 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
198. 565 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
199. 645 S.W.2d at 267. Prior judicial decisions overruled by Ashcrofl include:
Lumberas v. State, 560 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Riddle v. State, 560 S.W.2d 642
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Prior executive action also showed that phentermine was treated
quite differently from methamphetamine and its isomers. The Texas Commissioner of
Health followed the national standard for phentermine. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
4476-15, § 2.06(d)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984). Texas treated methamphetamine and its iso-
mers more severely, however, by placing them in Penalty Group I, which carries the most
severe penalties under the Controlled Substances Act. See id § 2.03(d)(6); 645 S.W.2d at
268-72.
200. 645 S.W.2d at 270.
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C Homosexual Conduct-Right to Privacy, Equal Protection
In Baker v. Wade20' a federal district court held that the Texas penal
statute prohibiting consensual deviate sexual intercourse202 by members of
the same sex was unconstitutional because it violated both the fundamen-
tal right to privacy and the right to equal protection of the laws.20 3 The
case was brought as a civil suit by an adult male homosexual. The federal
court reached the merits of the plaintiffs constitutional claims despite the
fact that the plaintiff was neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecu-
tion under the rarely enforced statute.2°4 The state argued that the plain-
tiff lacked standing because no genuine risk of prosecution existed. The
court rejected this argument for several reasons. First, homosexuals have
in fact been prosecuted under prior Texas sodomy statutes. Second, both
the district attorney and the city attorney of Dallas stated that they would
prosecute the plaintiff and other homosexuals under section 21.06 if a
provable violation of the law came to their attention. Third, it was not
necessary that plaintiff expose himself to actual arrest and prosecution in
order to challenge the statute. Finally, plaintiff and other homosexuals
suffer detriments from section 21.06 aside from the threat of prosecution
and the $200 fine, including difficulty in obtaining and maintaining em-
ployment because of employer reluctance to hire criminals, severe anxiety
caused by threat of criminal punishment, and alleged harassment of pa-
trons of known homosexual bars. 205
To decide the merits of the plaintiff's right to privacy claim the court
examined cases protecting a right to privacy with regard to such issues as
marriage, procreation, and contraception. The court concluded that the
right extended to private sexual conduct between all consenting adults,
whether heterosexual or homosexual.20 6 Although the court recognized
that the right to privacy was not absolute, it stated that any statute imping-
ing on that right must be justified by a compelling state interest, a standard
that the state failed to meet.207
201. 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
202. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 1974). Deviate sexual intercourse is
defined by TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01 as "any contact between any part of the genitals
of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or. . . the penetration of the geni-
tals or the anus of another person with an object." Id § 21.01(1).
203. 553 F. Supp. at 1147.
204. Neither party presented evidence that anyone had ever been prosecuted under the
statute, although there had been prosecutions under prior Texas sodomy statutes. The court
also rejected the state's argument that it should not reach the merits because of the absten-
tion doctrine. The court did not abstain because no criminal charges were pending against
the defendant, and no unsettled question of state law was present that might have disposed
of the issue. Id. at 1146.
205. Id. at 1146-47.
206. Id at 1140-41. The court rejected the state's argument that the right to privacy was
limited to marital intimacy and procreative choice. Id.
207. Id. at 1143. The court concluded that the statute could not be justified by the as-
serted state interests of morality, decency, public health, and procreation. Id.
Because the statute does not prohibit deviate sexual intercourse between consenting adults
of the opposite sex but only between members of the same sex, the discrimination between
heterosexuals and homosexuals must bear some rational relationship to legitimate state pur-
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D. Sex Offenses-New Consolidated Statutes
When H.B. 2008 went into effect on September 1, 1983, it modified most
of the sex offense statutes in the Texas Penal Code. 20 8 Although the bill
repealed the crimes of rape, 20 9 aggravated rape,210 sexual abuse, 2" aggra-
vated sexual abuse,212 rape of a child, 213 and sexual abuse of a child,214 it
retained the major provisions of these statutes in two new consolidated
statutes covering sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault. 21 5 The two
new statutes are gender neutral; the crimes of sexual assault and aggra-
vated sexual assault may be committed against a victim of either sex by a
perpetrator of either sex who forces another to commit a nonconsensual
sexual act, or who commits a consensual sexual act with a child. The stat-
utes group the crimes of rape, aggravated rape, and rape of a child, which
formerly could only be committed by a male, with the gender neutral of-
fenses of sexual abuse and aggravated sexual abuse. 216 The statutes incor-
porate the former defenses to rape of a child and sexual abuse of a child-
promiscuous sexual conduct by a fourteen- to seventeen- year-old of the
opposite sex, and the circumstances that the actor was of the opposite sex
and not more than two years older than the victim 217-into the new sexual
assault statute without the opposite sex restriction.218
The new offenses must be committed intentionally or knowingly,
whereas several of the old statutes did not require a culpable mental
state. 219 Even in those former provisions with no statutory mens rea re-
quirement, however, the courts provided one by reference to section
6.02(b).220
The statutory exemption of spouses contained in many of the repealed
statutes is retained in H.B. 2008. The spousal exemption in the former
poses. The plaintiff claimed that the discrimination must be justified by a compelling state
interest or under the emerging intermediate level of review, but the court found it unneces-
sary to reach these claims because of its finding that the statute did not even meet the ra-
tional basis test. Id. at 1144-45.
208. Act of Sept. 1, 1983, ch. 977, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5311-21 [hereinafter cited as H.B.
20081. The legislation did not modify TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.07 (Vernon 1974) (pub-
lic lewdness); id § 21.08 (indecent exposure); id. § 21.11 (indecency with a child); id § 21.06
(deviate sexual intercourse).
209. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1982-1983) (repealed 1983).
210. Id. § 21.03.
211. Id. §21.04.
212. Id. § 21.05.
213. Id. § 21.09.
214. Id. § 21.10.
215. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.011, .021 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
216. See id. § 22.011 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
217. Id §§ 21.09(b)-(c), .10 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1982-1983) (repealed 1983).
218. Id §§ 22.011(d)(1), .011(e) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
219. See id. § 21.02 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1982-1983) (repealed 1983) (rape); id. § 21.03
(repealed 1983) (aggravated rape); id. § 21.09 (repealed 1983) (rape of child).
220. Id § 6.02(b); see Ford v. State, 615 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Exparle
Smith, 571 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Zachery v. State, 552 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977); Braxton v. State, 528 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
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crimes of rape of a child and sexual abuse of a child,221 however, has been
deleted from the portions of sexual assault dealing with children. 222 In
addition, "spouse" is given a new definition that now excludes married
persons who do not reside together or who have an action pending be-
tween them for divorce or separate maintainance. 223 The former statutes
extended the spousal exemption to unmarried cohabitators, 224 but the new
statutes do not.2 25
The new statute has also changed the definition of "without consent."
Under the former statutes if the lack of consent was based on the use of
force, the victim had an implied duty to resist, because the statutory lan-
guage required that the force would overcome "such earnest resistance as
might be reasonably expected under the circumstances. ' 226 The threat of
force was sufficient to establish lack of consent only if it "would prevent
resistance by a person of ordinary resolution, under the same or similar
circumstances, because of a reasonable fear of harm. '227 The new statute
eliminates the "earnest resistance" language by providing that consent is
not present if "the actor compels the other person to submit or participate
by the use of physical force or violence. ' 228 There is also no consent when
the threat of force is used if the victim "believes that the actor has the
present ability to execute the threat. '229 Thus, the new statutes replace the
objective standard of a person of ordinary resolution with the victim's sub-
jective belief in the actor's ability to execute the threat. The new statute
also contains a new basis for lack of consent. A victim has not consented
when "the actor compels the other person to submit or participate by
threatening to use force or violence against any person, and the other per-
son believes that the actor has the ability to execute the threat. ' 230 For the
first time, statutes recognize that the lack of consent can be based on a
threat directed at someone other than the person compelled to submit to or
participate in the sexual act.231
221. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.09(a), .10(a) (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1982-1983) (re-
pealed 1983).
222. Id. §§ 22.01 l(a)(2), (c), (d) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
223. Id. § 22.011(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
224. Id. § 21.12 (Vernon 1974) (repealed 1983).
225. See id § 22.011 (c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
226. Id. § 21.04(b)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (repealed 1983); see also id
§ 21.02(b)(1) (repealed 1983) (rape).
227. Id. § 21.04(b)(2) (repealed 1983); see also id § 21.02(b)(2) (repealed 1983) (rape).
228. Id. § 22.01 l(b)(i) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
229. Id § 22.011(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
230. Id. § 22.011(b)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
231. A new defense is also added to the portions of sexual assault and aggravated sexual
assault offenses pertaining to children. The defense permits conduct that "consisted of med-
ical care for the child." H.B. 2008 at 5314. The defense clarifies that, for example, a doctor's
use of a rectal thermometer with a child does not constitute an offense.
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E Theft and More Specfic Illegal Appropriations-General/Specfic
Offenses
The defendants in Williams v. State232 and Tawfik v. State233 won rever-
sals of theft convictions because the state had prosecuted them under the
wrong statute.234 In Tawfik the evidence showed that the defendant sold
what he stated were two genuine Egyptian artifacts from the New King-
dom Period. The "scarabs" involved were actually low quality reproduc-
tions that had been made to appear ancient. In Williams the defendant
signed a promissory note, which he secured by assigning his accounts re-
ceivable to a bank. When the defendant received payment on one of the
outstanding accounts, he deposited the funds in his corporate account and
immediately withdrew them when he should have transferred them to the
bank under the assignment agreement. The consolidated theft statute is
broad enough to include the conduct in both cases, and the state produced
sufficient evidence of theft. The court, however, decided that the defend-
ants should have been charged under more specific statutes: "Criminal
Simulation" 235 in the case of Tawfik 236 and "Hindering Secured Credi-
tors"237 in the case of Williams.238 Violation of either of these statutes is a
Class A misdemeanor, and the court held that the defendants were entitled
to prosecution under the more lenient specific statutes rather than under
the general felony theft statute. 239
Texas law requiring prosecution under a more specific statute carrying a
lesser penalty than an applicable, but more general statute, is arguably
more solicitous to criminal defendants than the federal constitution would
require. In United States v. Batchelder240 the United States Supreme
232. 641 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
233. 643 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
234. The defendants were prosecuted under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (Vernon
Supp. 1984), which provides in part: "A person commits an offense if he unlawfully appro-
priates property with intent to deprive the owner of property. (b) Appropriation of property
is unlawful if: (i) it is without the owner's effective consent; or (2) the property is stolen and
the actor appropriates the property knowing it was stolen by another." Id § 31.03(a), (b).
235. Id. § 32.22(b) (Vernon 1974). This section provides in part:
(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to defraud or harm another:
(1) he makes or alters an object, in whole or in part, so that it appears to
have value because of age, antiquity, rarity, source, or authorship that it does
not have;
(2) he sells, passes, or otherwise utters an object so made or altered ....
Id
236. 643 S.W.2d at 128.
237. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.33 (Vernon Supp. 1984). This section provides in
part: "(b) A person who has signed a security agreement creating a security interest in prop-
erty . . . commits an offense if, with intent to hinder enforcement of that interest of lien, he
destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, or otherwise harms or reduces the value of the
property." Id § 32.33(b).
238. 641 S.W.2d at 239.
239. These cases exemplify the Texas rule that criminals be prosecuted under a more
specific statute carrying a lesser penalty rather than under an applicable, more general stat-
ute if the statutes have the same general purpose. See Ex parte Harrell, 542 S.W.2d 169
(Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
240. 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
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Court rejected a claim that the defendant was constitutionally entitled to
prosecution under the statute carrying the lesser penalty when his conduct
violated two overlapping statutes. The court stated that "[w]hen an act
violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute
under either. . . . Whether to prosecute and what charge to file .. are
decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's discretion."
24
'
F Involuntary Manslaughter-One Crime or Two?
In Exparte Rathme1 242 the defendant, driving while intoxicated, struck
an automobile carrying two women. Both women died as a result of the
collision. The defendant was separately indicted for involuntary man-
slaughter of both women. 243 He was convicted and sentenced based on an
indictment naming one of the women, and the conviction was affirmed on
appeal.24 The state then attempted to try the involuntary manslaughter
indictment naming the other victim. Rathmell filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus alleging that the second indictment should be dismissed on
double jeopardy grounds. 245 He argued that one automobile accident
could result in only one offense.
The court first noted that the doctrine that previously determined most
multiple offense issues in Texas, the carving doctrine, had recently been
abolished. 246 Courts now apply the Blockburger v. United States 247 test,
which allows the state to prosecute under two or more separate statutory
provisions even though only one criminal transaction or act is committed
so long as each statutory provision requires proof of a fact that the other
241. Id at 123-24.
242. 664 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no pet.).
243. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05(a)(2) (Vernon 1974).
244. Rathmell v. State, 653 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, pet. refd).
245. Exparte Rathmell, 664 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1983, no pet.).
The court addressed the threshold question of whether habeas corpus was available when
the result of a ruling in favor of the petitioner would not result in his release. Id. at 387-88.
The majority concluded that while petitioner's complete release could not be secured be-
cause of his incarceration stemming from the prior involuntary manslaughter conviction, the
fact that he was in custody was partly due to the second indictment. Id. Justice Kennedy, in
an opinion concurring with the majority's disposition on the merits dissented on the jurisdic-
tional issue, stating that habeas relief must result in immediate discharge or it is not avail-
able. Id. at 391, (dissenting and concurring opinion). This position was based on Exparte,
Ruby, 403 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966), which Justice Kennedy said "has not been
overruled to this day." Ruby's viability is questionable after Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54
(1968), in which a prisoner was allowed to attack only the second of two consecutive
sentences in a habeas corpus petition although success on the merits would not result in his
immediate discharge. Peyton overruled the former prematurity doctrine. See McNally v.
Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
246. 664 S.W.2d at 388; see Ex parte McWilliams, 634 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Crim. App.
1982). The carving doctrine permitted the state to "carve" only one offense from a single
criminal episode. The court's refusal to consider prior Texas cases because of the abandon-
ment of the carving doctrine is curious. In Rathmell the question was how many times the
same statute was violated, or in other words, how many "acts" had occurred. Determining
the number of "acts" was the central focus of the carving doctrine. See McWilliams, 634
S.W.2d at 823-24. The carving doctrine was not a model of clarity, but the decisions under
the carving doctrine were hardly irrelevant to the case.
247. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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does not.248 The Rathmell court correctly noted, however, that the Block-
burger rule did not apply to this case because the same statutory provision
was alleged in the two counts. The court still had to decide, however,
whether the existence of two victims meant that two offenses had been
committed, or whether the state could charge Rathmel only once because
only one criminal transaction had transpired. 249
The court examined the statute itself and declared that the legislature
had not given a clear indication that it intended to authorize multiple con-
victions in cases where there was one automobile accident but multiple
victims. 250 The court held that since the jury that sentenced the defendant
at the first trial knew all of the circumstances surrounding the death of the
other victim, to allow the defendant to be convicted and punished for the
second death would cause him to be sentenced twice for each offense. 251
The court noted that the double jeopardy prohibition is not merely a pro-
tection against multiple prosecutions; it is also a protection against multi-
ple punishments. 252
248. Id at 304.
249. The court, citing cases from other jurisdictions, noted that the majority rule is to
allow as many convictions as victims. See also Remington & Joseph, Charging, Convicting
and Sentencing the Multiple Offender, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 528, 549-50 (stating that in princi-
pal a distinction might be drawn based on defendant's knowledge that act would harm more
than one victim).
The Rathmell court sought guidance from other jurisdictions because of reluctance "to
rely on law established prior to the carving doctrine and because so little authority exists
since its demise." 664 S.W.2d at 389. The review of cases from other states deciding similar
issues was of little assistance for two reasons: first, there was a split of authority, and second,
it was a question of state law as to what the legislature intended in passing the particular
statute. For example, how the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted the intent of the Wis-
consin Legislature in passing that state's homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle
statute is of little assistance in deciding the unit of the offense of the Texas involuntary
manslaughter statute.
250. This conclusion is similar to a rule of statutory construction often used to determine
multiple criminality issues, the rule of lenity. Under the rule of lenity, if an ambiguity exists
regarding whether a statute authorizes multiple convictions, doubt is resolved in favor of the
defendant. See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 82 (1955). The court in Rathmell, how-
ever, stated that it was not applying the rule of lenity because TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.05
(Vernon 1974) states that "[t]he rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not
apply to this code."
251. 664 S.W.2d at 390-91.
252. Id The double jeopardy argument is circular. The double jeopardy clause only
protects against multiple punishment for the same offense. See North Carolina v. Pierce, 395
U.S. 711, 717 (1969). The question before the court was whether the involuntary man-
slaughter of one victim was the same offense as the involuntary manslaughter of the other
victim. Although Rathmell's double jeopardy analysis is unpersuasive, Rathmell is an ap-
propriate case to hold that lack of a separate intent (or state of mind) towards the separate
victims and a single physical event should result in only one offense. As one commentary
expressed it:
[A] distinction might well be drawn based on a defendant's knowledge that his
act would likely produce harm to more than one person. For example, the
person who blows up a plane with 44 persons in it knows of the probable
existence of many passengers . . . .On the other hand, a person who drives
his car in a manner amounting to a high degree of negligence and who collides
with and kills three occupants of another car, is no more culpable than he
would have been had the other car contained only one occupant. The conclu-
1984]
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G. Enhancement of Sentence-The Second Time Around
Several cases during the survey period dealt with multiple attempts by
the state to prove enhancement allegations, and the court of criminal ap-
peals extended its earlier holding in Cooper v. State.253 In Cooper the
court held that the failure to prove all of the facts necessary to support an
enhancement allegation prevented the state from attempting to establish
the same allegations at a new hearing. 25 4 In ExparteAugusta, 255 a habeas
corpus proceeding, the court held that Cooper applied retroactively.
256
In Carter v. State2 57 the court also gave Cooper retroactive effect even
though the state did not allege the same two prior offenses for enhance-
ment on retrial as it had in the original proceeding. The defendant was
found guilty of aggravated robbery. He was automatically sentenced to
life imprisonment under Penal Code section 12.42(d)2 58 when the jury
found allegations that the defendant had been convicted of two prior felo-
nies to be true. The defendant and the state joined in a motion for retrial
when they discovered that one of the two prior felonies used for enhance-
ment had resulted in a probated sentence and was, therefore, not consid-
ered a final conviction. On retrial the defendant was charged and
convicted of aggravated robbery, but the enhancement allegations were
changed because the state substituted a final conviction for the one that
had resulted in a probated sentence. The court of criminal appeals vacated
the life sentence imposed after retrial under Cooper, thus denying the state
from taking a second chance to prove the enhancement allegations.2 59 The
Carter court noted, however, that the state could seek to prove two prior
felonies if a defendant is tried for a new offense rather than retried for the
same one.
After Carter was decided, the legislature amended section 12.42(d). 260
sion that there might be a number of convictions in the first situation and only
one in the second, would not seem to do violence to the legislative objective.
Remington & Joseph, supra note 249, at 549-50.
253. 631 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). In Cooper the state alleged that the de-
fendant had been convicted of two previous felony offenses. On appeal, however, the court
held that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the second conviction was for an
offense occurring after the date that the first offense had become final. Id. at 512.
254. Id. at 514. The court expressly adopted the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' reason-
ing in Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1982). 631 S.W.2d at 514. The court also
relied on Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19
(1978), which held that double jeopardy prohibited a retrial if an appellate court has found
the evidence insufficient.
255. 639 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
256. Id. at 484. Cooper was also given retroactive application in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding in Exparte Stuart, 653 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) despite the fact that the
applicant had filed at least 10 prior habeas corpus petitions and had been cited for abuse of
the writ. But see Exparte Girnus, 640 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (holding that
Cooper was not violated where error of court, not insufficiency of evidence, led to failure to
enhance).
257. 652 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1983, pet. granted).
258. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974).
259. 652 S.W.2d at 532.
260. Act of Sept. 1, 1983 ch. 339, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 1750 (codified at TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
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That section no longer carries the mandatory life sentence upon proof that
a defendant has been convicted of two prior felonies. The new section
provides that after the required showing, punishment shall be assessed for
"life, or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years."'26'
H Criminally Negligent Homicide-Can a Corporation Commit
Homicide?
In Vaughn & Sons, Inc. v. State262 a corporation appealed a conviction
of negligent homicide, which was based upon an indictment alleging that
the corporation, acting through two of its employees, caused the death of
two individuals in an automobile collision.263 Under Texas law prior to
1974 a private corporation could not be indicted for a criminal offense.
264
Penal Code section 7.22265 now provides for penal liability of corporations
and associations, and section 1.07(a)(27) 266 contemplates corporate penal
liability by including corporation within the definition of person. 267 This
provision, however, proved to be the undoing of the negligent homicide
conviction. The trial court's assumption that the word "person" in the
Penal Code was intended to include corporations in each instance led it to
conclude that corporations could be guilty of crimes requiring intent. On
appeal the court held that since a corporation cannot form an intent, the
legislature could not have intended such a result. 268 Although criminally
negligent homicide does not necessitate a subjective intent, the similarity
between that offense and the homicide offenses that do require intent led
the court to state that "whoever is capable of committing criminal homi-
cide must also be capable of intent, knowledge, and recklessness-not just
criminal negligence. '2 69 The court held that a clearer indication of legisla-
tive intent to include corporations within the definition of person in the
homicide statutes would be required before corporations will be held liable
for homicide.270
261. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
262. 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983, pet. granted).
263. The trial court imposed a $5000 fine on the corporation. Id at 677.
264. See Overt v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 202, 260 S.W.856 (1924); Judge Lynch Int'l Book
Publishing Co. v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. 459, 208 S.W.2d 526 (1919).
265. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.22 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1984).
266. Id. § 1.07(a)(27) (Vernon 1974).
267. See also id. § 12.51 (imposing specific penalty provisions applicable only to corpora-
tions and associations).
268. 649 S.W.2d at 678.
269. Id at 679.
270. Id.
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